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A spectre is haunting European journalism. As the news organizations of the east of the 
continent, in its former Communist bloc, find their way in the new societies which have 
grown up since the collapse of Marxism-Leninism, and those of the west struggle with 
fractured audiences and dwindling resources, the former capital of the Soviet Union is now 
home to a new kind of journalism with global ambitions, and the resources to fund them.  
 
In November, I visited Prague to speak at a conference on journalism in former Communist 
countries. The conference took place on the 25th anniversary of Czechoslovakia’s Velvet 
Revolution. The city still seemed to shine with pride at having thrown off the shackles of 
Communism. Like the rest of the European Union, this pride was tarnished here and there – 
uncertainties over the continent’s future direction and prospects inevitably, as elsewhere, 
made themselves felt. Yet there was something else, too. At the conference to, most of the 
discussion was nominally about countries which had successfully made the transition to new 
economic and social systems. Yes, some veterans of dissident journalism bemoaned the rise 
of tabloid culture; others expressed concern about ownership models which, they felt, 
favoured oligarchs. Overall, though, many of the concerns were similar to those which one 
might have heard raised at a conference in Western Europe: budgets, competition from the 
internet, and a apparent lack of desire from audiences for serious news. Among these near 
universal contemporary challenges, another forced its way onto the agenda: RT, as Russia 
Today now prefers to be known. Not nominally the subject of any of the panel discussions, it 
still managed to appear at most of them, like an unwelcome spirit at a séance.  
 
For many of the delegates: from elsewhere in the Czech Republic; from Poland; from 
Hungary; it must have felt like a haunting – especially for those old enough to remember 
when Moscow held the ultimate authority over their countries, and proved itself willing to 
enforce that with tanks and troops. An end to communism in those lands was also an end to 
something else: Russian influence. On reporting trips to Lithuania, and Poland in the 1990s, I 
remember struggling to communicate. A speaker neither of Lithuanian or of Polish, but of 
Russian, I was sensitive enough to the political situation to try English first in shops and 
cafes. When that did not work – English speakers in those countries were fewer then – I tried 
Russian. Those aged under twenty-five did not understand; those aged over twenty-five 
showed from their faces first that they did, and secondly that they wished they did not. In any 
case, they answered in their own languages which I did not understand.  
 
Russia’s recent military confrontations with its neighbours – Georgia in 2008, Ukraine today 
– have dragged from the grave ghosts which many in Eastern Europe hoped had been finally 
laid to rest. As Moscow has responded to a changing world with a range of military and 
diplomatic moves – recognized by friend and foe alike as tactical successes, even if questions 
remain over their wisdom from a strategic point of view – it has sometimes been accused of 
ignoring the way the world is supposed to work in the 21st century. In another aspect, though, 
it has shown itself to have mastered some of the media techniques which are an integral part 
of contemporary international confrontation and conflict.  
 
In this respect, Russia has come a long way in a relatively short time. Russia Today began life 
in the last decade. As many channels are at launch – I write as a veteran of the launches of 
both GMTV and BBC News 24 – it was clumsy and clunky at times. It also had a style all of 
its own. The presenters and reporters were either native English speakers apparently in search 
of a career break, or a career relaunch, or Russians who spoke very good, if accented English. 
Most of the latter group shared the same accent – a hint of American, a hint remaining of 
Russian – which tended to suggest that they were scions of that part of the Soviet 
establishment which had managed to continue to prosper in the new Russia. The people who 
proved most successful at this often had a KGB background. Still, it was nothing really to be 
taken seriously. As BBC Moscow correspondent at the time, I learnt from a visiting western 
television executive, who had had a meeting with Russia Today, that the global audience had 
two hotspots. These were the Palestinian Territories, and Australia. The former could perhaps 
be explained by the desire of some Palestinians to improve their English. The latter seemed to 
offer little to celebrate. A more detailed examination of the viewing figures revealed that 
prime time was late in the evening – in other words, once people had come home from the 
pub and were looking for a bit of a beery laugh.  
 
Two years later, as Russia went to war with Georgia over the separatist Georgian territories 
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia Today remained in second place – even apparently in 
the eyes of the Kremlin. Seemingly feeling that they were losing the media battle as Georgian 
officials, right up to President Mikheil Saakashvili himself, made themselves available 
around the clock to international news channels, Moscow responded by offering to the 
international media interviews with the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov. Russia 
Today was not among the recipients, and was reduced to asking for a copy of the BBC’s 
recording for its own output.  
 
These were times of transition, and there was a feeling that Russia was feeling its way. Part 
of their approach involved hiring western public relations companies in an effort to seek more 
favourable coverage. This had limited success. Russia’s military confrontation with Georgia, 
wherever the blame lay, was always going to be a hard sell because of the countries’ relative 
sizes and military strength. Lingering Cold War attitudes, added to the fact that Russia’s most 
powerful politician, Vladimir Putin (at the time of the war, Prime Minister rather than 
President, but evidently still very much the boss) had been in the KGB, meant that 
stereotypes emerged to stalk the news pages once more. Russia’s attempts to promote its 
version of events were further hampered by its own lack of understanding of the way the 
international – in this case, western – media functioned. In a country where cynicism had 
flourished after the short-lived excitement of the end of Communism, journalism had suffered 
too. Oligarchs’ desire to settle scores through the media outlets they had acquired, combined 
with the poor rates of pay offered to many reporters, meant that editorial space was often for 
sale. Conversations with western PRs in Moscow at the time revealed that some in the higher 
levels of Russian officialdom believed the same to be true of the international media – and 
that consequently, poor coverage in the western press just meant their media advisors were 
not influencing the right people in the right way. The overall effect was that Russia seemed to 
feel that it was being forced to take part in a game of which it did not understand the rules. It 
was fighting a losing battle in what was in effect a media war of necessity.  
 
Almost six years after Russia and Georgia went to war, Moscow found itself involved once 
more in a former Soviet republic: Ukraine. Much had changed. The Russian military had 
overcome inefficiencies which the campaign in Georgia had laid bare. Huge resources had 
gone into fixing the shortcomings. Something similar had happened to Russia’s media, too. In 
fact there was almost a common approach to fighting both the military campaign, and the 
media one. Both involved a degree of disguise, and playing on the resulting uncertainty.  
 
In the military campaign, troops without insignia – but resembling in every other respect 
Russian Army regulars – took over key sites in Crimea: the first stage in what was to be a 
Russian annexation (albeit one subsequently approved by a questionable referendum).  As 
Vitaly Shevchenko of BBC Monitoring noted at the time, ‘This poses a challenge to the 
media covering the crisis: what do you call people who are officially not there?’1 While 
members of western military intelligence presumably had no doubts, it was a headache for 
journalists wanting to be certain of what they were saying. Russia was in effect not only 
exploiting a military vulnerability, but a characteristic of the western tradition of impartial 
reporting, too.  
 
Nor is this the only weak spot which Russia had found. In the same way that the Russian 
army was back, better resourced and in disguise, so was Kremlin-sponsored media. 
Somewhere along the line (you will look in vain on the Russia Today website ‘History 
Section’ for a date) Russia Today became the much more neutral sounding RT: the media war 
equivalent of going into battle without insignia. Along with its rebranding, it acquired 
something of which few western media organizations can boast in today’s tough climate: 
massive resources. Reporting in the autumn of 2014 on RT’s launch of a specific channel for 
the U.K., The Guardian website said that the Kremlin-backed channel’s budget for 2015 was 
expected to be ‘about £250m’ -- an increase of ‘nearly 30% on its funding from 2014.’ The 
same article quoted President Putin as having urged staff to ‘break the Anglo-Saxon 
monopoly on the global information streams’2. 
 
RT may still have a credibility problem – especially in the eyes of those who continue to 
think of it as Russia Today – but to see it purely in those terms is to miss the point. For RT’s 
purpose is not necessarily to see its version of events established as undisputed. Its purpose is 
to challenge, and to disrupt: to ‘break the Anglo-Saxon monopoly’ rather than create its own.  
It has set about its task with admirable efficiency. Its posters – minus the word ‘Russia’, 
naturally – now adorn the corridors of the London underground. Its very watchable 
programming can be seen pretty much everywhere – including in Prague, as I discovered (not 
to my surprise) when checking the channels on the TV in the hotel where I was staying for 
the conference.  
 
The transformation from clunky copy of western news channel to something slick, well-
resourced, and watchable has been remarkable – even if the idea that Russia has become 
some kind of global defender of alternative views, and unshackled reporting, is itself 
suprising. The country has never scored highly in surveys of press freedom. In 2014, 
Reporters without Borders placed it 148th in the world3. Any channel really concentrating on 
Russia today would probably need to cover stories like that – but they would also need to 
reflect the fact that many in the country are full of approval for Mr Putin’s foreign policy.  
 
RT’s approach fits well into a time when trust in politicians is low, and Western Europe looks 
timidly to the future unsure of what security or financial problems may lie ahead. RT is no 
longer an outsider in a global media game which Russia does not understand. Its days of 
begging from the BBC copies of news-making interviews are over. Western journalistic 
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techniques, and western technology in the shape of social media platforms, have been copied 
and adapted.  
 
That is how RT has come to haunt European journalism, especially in former Communist 
countries. Like any ghost, this spectre comes to unsettle, to plant doubt, to make those who 
see it unsure of what they think they know. RT urges its viewers to ‘question more’. It is 
sound advice. One question might be ‘Why did you drop the word ‘Russia’ from your name?’   
